Continued from Part III

Wayne arrived upon the completion of the fort and conducted a dedication ceremony, thanking the soldiers for their work.  Following the dedication Wayne departed with most of the soldiers for Fort Greenville, leaving two infantry companies and an artillery detachment as garrison.  He cautioned the post commander, Captain Alexander Gibson, for keeping out “constant & proper patrols,” and scouting the Indian villages.

The Indians took insult from the occupation of the St. Clair battlefield, ground that they considered sacred.  If they allowed the presence of Fort Recovery and its garrison it showed a “loss of face,” for their warriors.  Besides, this fort moved the threat from the American soldiers even farther into the heart of their homeland.  Miami emissaries journeyed great distances for securing alliances from other tribes against the hated Americans.  Desperate, some demanded that the British support them directly with troops in the field.

While the Indians assembled an army for meeting the American army, Wayne pleaded for more troops.  Bureaucratic “red tape” and congressional interference did not begin with the current war against terrorism.  In the Army of General Wayne the Senate must approve all promotions for officers, ensuring that each state received its portion.  Some of these promotions dated from February and March of 1793, hardly conducive for effective leadership of the Legion.  Of course the Senate disapproved of many of Wayne’s selections and selected their political favorites.

Congress did authorize an increase in numerical strength, just not for the Legion on the frontier.  It approved a “Corps of Artillerists and Engineers” of four battalions for defending the eastern seaports.  Concerned with the continuing war in Europe, and Royal Navy ships hovering outside American harbors, Congress authorized the fortification of our seaports.  For reducing military expenditures Congress made this “corps” part of the authorized 5,000 for the Legion.  This highlights another tradition of Congress, believing they know the nation’s military needs better than commanders in the field.

When spring of 1794 arrived intelligence showed an increase in Indian activity, and British advances into American territory.  Patrols around Fort Recovery captured several Indian scouts who provided valuable information of the assembling Indian army.  The British constructed a new fort, Fort Miamis, on the Maumee River near modern Toledo, Ohio.  Built on the site of a previous British fort abandoned in 1783, the British justified this reoccupation as a Detroit “dependency.”

The massive Indian army of over 2,000 warriors began assembling at Grand Glaize in mid-June, 1794.  They further demanded that all “white men either English or French residing among them or getting their livelihood through the Indian Trade…immediately join the Indian Army.”  Fourteen British officers from Detroit, dressed in frontier garb, joined these Indians as “observers” because the Indians gave them no choice.

Because food and provisions began running short from the increased number of Indians assembled, they moved toward Fort Recovery.  As they traveled the large number required that they kill all the game in their path.  This further created desperation as the Indians must replenish their scant supplies from the captured American fort.  Therefore, they must capture the fort, or they and their families faced some very hard times.

Wayne experienced more good fortune as a detachment of Chickasaw and Choctaw joined him about this time.  These tribes, enemies of the Miami for years, eagerly joined the Americans and scouted toward the Grand Glaize encampment.  Forty-five Choctaw and ten white scouts encountered the advancing Indian army on June 26th.  They retreated and on June 28th warned Wayne the Indians “in great force and advancing,” with “a great number of white men.”

Furthermore, on the evening of June 29th a mixed company of Chickasaw and Choctaw tried informing the Fort Recovery garrison of the Indian army.  Unfortunately none of the Indians spoke English and tried using sign language for communication.  Fortunately Captain Gibson prudently took precautions by sending out patrols; however they found nothing.

Outside the gates of Fort Recovery a supply convoy of about three hundred horses bivouacked overnight.  They previously delivered supplies and prepared for their return trip for the safety of Fort Greenville.  The previously mentioned Major McMahon commanded this convoy and the escort included over 150 troops.  At seven o’clock on the morning of June 30th the soldiers and civilian contractors prepared for their return.

Suddenly shots rang out as the Indians attacked the unsuspecting train of packhorses causing a stampede.  McMahon, mounted on a horse, tried forming his men for battle when he fell dead from a bullet wound in his neck.  For once, the soldiers did not panic, although they withdrew hastily toward the fort against the overwhelming odds.  Gibson even sent some of his men from the garrison as reinforcements for McMahon’s men.  These few men actually beat back the initial attack with their bayonets until forced back inside the fort.

The Indians surrounded the fort and used the cover of cut tree stumps for firing on the soldiers.  Inside the fort the soldiers kept up a “galling fire,” as an unnamed British officer recorded.  The soldiers made good use of the recaptured artillery pieces, which proved a tremendous psychological weapon on the Indians.  While most Indians willingly endured small arms fire, the artillery proved too much, without their own guns.

Ironically, the Indians expected the previously hidden cannon for use against the American fort.  A British artillery detachment from Fort Miamis accompanied the Indians and brought with them several packhorses loaded with ammunition.  Later reports stated that the Indians spent several hours unsuccessfully searching for the hidden guns.  Fortunately for the Americans, Wayne specifically ordered the search for these guns during the construction of Fort Recovery.

The Indians lost the initiative and kept up a continual fire on the fort throughout the day.  An unnamed British officer expressed his disgust with this tactic, and stated that it only “run up their own casualties.”  A further demoralizing fact, an unknown number of Chickasaw and Choctaw got behind the Miami confederacy and engaged them from the rear.  With so many new tribes recently joining the Miami, they did not know each other and accused each other of fratricide.

Discouraged, the Miami tried one last surprise attack after dark, with no better results than during the day.  A few warriors fired on the fort early the next morning with no enthusiasm and then fell back into the woods.  Discouraged and running low on food the massive Indian army began breaking up and leaving the field.  Several tribes concluded that they fulfilled their commitment for the alliance and went home.  With their numbers significantly reduced by these departures, the other Indians went home.  They suffered about forty killed and about one hundred wounded and left the field a demoralized force.

Inside the fort the soldiers and civilian contractors suffered nineteen killed, thirty wounded and three missing.  Burial details sent outside the fort discovered the mutilated bodies of those killed during the initial assault.  Despite their high casualties the men of Fort Recovery felt proud that they beat back this attack of a vastly superior force.  Gibson sent Wayne a jubilant message on July 2nd announcing the victory.

Wayne immediately dispatched reinforcements and replenished the fort’s supplies the next day.  He also sent a congratulatory message for the troops and lamented those lost during the battle.  When Wayne visited the fort about one month later he personally thanked every soldier present.  The momentum changed, the soldiers withstood almost impossible odds and defeated the vaunted Miami Confederacy.

News of the victory spread quickly on the frontier and made Independence Day celebrations even more exuberant.  In Cincinnati the public toast included the names of the officers killed at Fort Recovery.  Western settlers, previously scornful of the federal government, jubilantly toasted “Washington, Congress, cabinet officers and foreign ministers, and American women.”  Others toasted Wayne, the Legion and “the heads of the various staff departments.”  In Kentucky they toasted the Kentucky volunteers, even though they did not participate in this battle.

Scott’s Kentuckians began assembling at Fort Washington in late May and departed for Fort Greenville on July 20th.  They began arriving at Fort Greenville on July 25th and the Legion prepared for movement into Indian country.  The Legion left at eight o’clock on the morning of July 28th amid a flurry of drums, fifes and bugle calls.

Once the Legion passed Fort Recovery they must cut their own road through the wilderness, which significantly slowed their march.  It further required the detachment of “pioneers,” men selected from each company and armed with axes.  In those days no “combat engineers” existed forcing the use of detailed soldiers, or hired civilian employees.  Wayne ordered the building of a road thirty feet wide, which required significant labor, and frequent rotation of these “pioneers.”

The Legion continued advancing using all the security measures that Wayne required, including fortified bivouac sites at night.  Indian scouts still lurked around the column looking for opportunities for picking off stragglers or stray horses.  However, no one straggled and no animals wandered loose, under threat of summary execution.  Wayne further ordered the construction of forts at strategic locations along the route, each requiring a garrison.

As the column advanced an incident occurred that jeopardized the success of the expedition, the disappearance of Robert Newman.  Newman, a hired surveyor, left camp telling the guards that he departed under the orders of Quartermaster O’Hara.  Tracked by Wells himself, the scout captain found where Newman fell into the hands of about four Indians.  O’Hara emphatically denied giving Newman such orders, and Wells found no sign of struggle, making Newman at least a deserter.  Wayne quickly denounced Newman as a “villain” and capable of giving the enemy “every information in his power” regarding the Legion.

Other officers in the Legion expressed divided opinions regarding Newman’s disappearance, and many believed him a British spy.  Historical sources differ on Newman’s status and the first British source labeled him a “deserter” when he reached Grand Glaize.  When he arrived at Detroit the British believed him an American spy sent “to deceive” them.  They based this on their experiences with other “deserters” sent among them for gathering intelligence.

Newman eventually saw Canada’s lieutenant governor, John Simcoe, the former commander of the Loyalist Queen’s Rangers.  Under interrogation, Newman revealed much of what he knew of Wayne’s plan, including a very accurate date regarding the Legion’s arrival in the Indian camp, August 17, 1794.  Based on Simcoe’s account, Newman further stated that Wayne intended an attack on any British post on American soil.  However, Newman denies this claiming, “I knew nothing of Gen. Wayne’s orders, or what Congress directed him to do.”

Miraculously the British released him and he reentered the US where he published an account of his “capture” in New York’s Catskill Packet.  At Philadelphia he boldly walked into the War Department and proclaimed himself an Indian captive, fortunately for him during Secretary Knox’s absence.  As a civilian employee no one suspected him of desertion, let alone treason, and he received twenty dollars for his journey home.  A few days later Wayne’s dispatch reached Philadelphia and eventually the commander at Pittsburgh arrested Newman.

Interrogated by Wayne, Newman revealed his real purpose, and it eventually involved Wilkinson and intrigue with the British.  The story goes that Wilkinson entered into a corrupt scheme with some of the contractors for enriching themselves by continuing the war.  It seems that one of the contractors, Robert Elliott, possessed a brother in the British service, Captain Matthew Elliott, currently at Grand Glaize.

Alarmed at this treachery, Wayne began rooting out other traitors as well, including the other surveyor, Daniel Cooper.  Cooper admitted that he wrote an incriminating letter found lying on the roadside, but later recanted his confession.  However, both he and Newman remained in custody until after the campaign, with their ultimate fate unmentioned in my sources.

No hard evidence existed against Wilkinson, and he continued as second-in-command throughout the campaign.  However, the Wayne-Wilkinson feud worsened with Wilkinson looking at any remark as an insult.  He kept a journal of all of Wayne’s criticisms of him, and history mostly proves Wayne correct.  Lieutenant Hugh Brady commented that “Wilkinson was jealous of W. could not be second and was worth nothing when he got to be first.”

An accident almost ended Wayne’s life on August 3rd, when a large beech tree fell on his tent.  This put the camp in great confusion as reports of the general’s death spread rapidly, and thankfully erroneously.  An old stump absorbed most of the force and Wayne suffered an injured left leg and ankle.  Upon examination someone carelessly kindled a fire near the tree and it toppled over.  History records the event as an accident; or did Wilkinson possess enough hatred for arranging the accident?  Suppose Wayne died and Wilkinson assumed command, again, did he possess the qualities necessary for winning victory?  Did he connive with the British for prolonging the war for paying off his rumored gambling debts with bribes?

While Newman told British officials three different stories, Wayne continued his advance, uncertain of Newman’s adventure.  In early August the Legion passed through several deserted Indian towns and the soldiers upgraded their rations with the abandoned crops.  As the troops advanced up the Maumee River they encountered an increasing number of Indian towns and a fertile valley.  Surprisingly they found few Indians as they advanced toward the main Indian camp of Grand Glaize.  They did not know that Newman informed the British of Wayne’s advance on Fort Miamis, and most of the Indians departed for there.

Wells and his scouts continued their intelligence gathering, bringing in prisoners each day with fresh information.  As their exploits became legend among the soldiers, the scouts always tried outdoing themselves.  Unfortunately, their luck ran out one day when they tried capturing fifteen Delaware by deception.  Wells and one of his officers, Lieutenant Robert McClellan, received serious wounds that took them out of the campaign.  From one of Wells’ Shawnee captives Wayne confirmed Newman’s treachery, eleven days after his desertion.

At Grand Glaize, Wayne built Fort Defiance, for denying the Indians this sanctuary and proving his power.  Here he sent the Miami Confederacy one last offer for peace through one of the recent Shawnee captives and one of his scouts, Christopher Miller.  A heavy rain delayed the advance of the Legion from this fort for two days longer than Wayne anticipated.  The recent rain hindered their march as both men and animals became mired in the mud.  Several accounts state that the march more resembled a mob than a military formation, but the advance continued.

The weather and rough march also deeply affected Wayne’s suffering from gout, however he still insisted on riding a horse.  His pain also made him even more short-tempered, causing more resentment with Wilkinson and other officers.  His demeanor improved somewhat with the return of Miller with the Indian response regarding his peace overture.  The message contained some deception as the Indians asked for time for considering Wayne’s offer.  In reality they wanted the time hoping that more warriors from the Pottawatomie might arrive from Detroit.

Eager for action, Wayne dismissed the call for time and began his advance  the next day entering a thick wooded area.  They encountered some of the roughest terrain yet and reached the rapids of the Maumee River, finding the river about six hundred yards wide.  Here American scouts began engaging the Indian scouts and Wayne camped for the night.  He delayed the advance until he successfully scouted the terrain ahead, and now lamented the loss of Wells.

Following sufficient reconnaissance Wayne ordered an advance on August 18th and encountered an increasing number of Indian towns.  Here the soldiers found themselves astonished at the number of well-constructed cabins and storehouses.  They further found a silversmith’s shop and books containing thirty years of accounts and extensive connections with Detroit.  Several of the stores showed the ownership of French traders for over one hundred years.

While Wayne advanced turmoil and indecision surfaced among the Indian alliance, and even Little Turtle changed his mind.  The battle at Fort Recovery shocked him regarding the Indian chance for victory against the entire Legion.  Attending a council in July at Detroit he tried unsuccessfully for obtaining direct British military action.  The British symbolically reinforced Fort Miamis and a company of Detroit militia joined the Indians.  However the British commander at Detroit, Lieutenant Colonel Richard England of His Majesty’s 24th Regiment of Foot (Infantry), made no promise of direct participation by British troops.

In early August a delegation of Wyandots presented England with the “war hatchet” originally given them during the Revolution.  They demanded that England “rub off the rust” and join them in defending their homeland from the Americans.  If not, the Wyandot promised no help if the Americans attacked Fort Miamis and Detroit.  With no authority, England merely alerted his command of the impending American threat and prepared for attack.

With his assembled Indian army running short of food and other provisions, Little Turtle began contemplating Wayne’s terms.  He further understood that the approaching American force outnumbered his dwindling number of warriors.  The unsuccessful attacks further proved that the Indians faced a competent commander and better quality troops than previous expeditions.  Even the arrival of a contingent of Mohawks, from the supposedly peaceful Iroquois, did not encourage Little Turtle.

When Little Turtle counseled peace he lost his charisma among the confederation, and his position of leadership.  Experiencing nothing but victory against the American forces, they did not heed his warning.  Little Turtle saw the future, that while the Indian alliance defeated each American expedition, another came the next year.  He further saw that each expedition increased in the number of soldiers sent against them, while the Indian numbers reduced.

Accused of cowardice, a Shawnee chief named Weyapiersenwah, Blue Jacket in English, emerged as the new leader of the Miami Confederacy.  Historians know little of Blue Jacket’s early life, since he only enters history as a grown warrior.  Rumors in the 19th Century named him as a white captive named Marmaduke van Swearingen, popularized by historical novelist Allan W. Eckert.  Supposedly DNA testing of descendants of both families disprove this rumor, confirming his Shawnee ancestry.  He participated in the Revolution as a British ally and in both of the Harmar and St. Clair defeats.

Although a brave man Blue Jacket lacked the tactical wisdom of Little Turtle and suffered from the vice of vanity.  Blue Jacket expressed a “fondness” for fancy dress and drink that often offended those around him.  He further proved the impetuous leader that the British needed at this time for keeping the Indians hostile toward the Americans.

Spurred on by the words of American renegade Simon Girty, the former American Loyalist and current British trader, Alexander McKee, the Indian leaders chose war.  Misinterpreting the reinforcement of Fort Miamis as a sign of British support the assembled warriors eagerly sought combat.

On August 18th Wayne ordered the construction of Fort Deposit for leaving all of his excess baggage.  While the troops built this fort, Wayne sent out his scouts for gathering the last intelligence before engaging the Indians.  Upon their return they estimated about 1,100 Indians and about 100 “white men,” probably the Detroit militia.  A heavy rain on August 19th delayed the Legion’s advance one day, allowing for more preparation.  The soldiers marched at about eight o’clock on the morning of August 20th in battle formation on a hot, humid day.

Wayne organized his force into two wings, the right consisting of the 1st and 3rd Sub-Legions under Wilkinson.  The left, consisting of the 2nd and 4th Sub-Legion under Lieutenant Colonel Hamtramck.  Between the two wings Wayne placed his headquarters, artillery and reserve ammunition loaded on packhorses.  An advance guard of scouts, under Major William Price, who previously scouted the terrain, marched well ahead for detecting ambush.  Behind them came an advance guard of seventy-four regulars under Captain John Cooke.

Advancing with the Maumee River protecting the right flank, the command used it for guiding their route toward the Indians.  Colonel Robert Todd’s brigade of mounted Kentuckians protected the left flank and Brigadier General Thomas Barbee’s Kentucky brigade served as rearguard.  Across the river Captain Ephraim Kibbey’s mounted scouts from the settlement of Columbia, near Cincinnati, provided security.

The Indians awaited them in a natural fortification formed by trees felled by a past tornado, hence “Fallen Timbers.”  Traditionally the Indians fasted before a battle in case they suffered a stomach wound.  However the slow American advance caused hunger, and overcame about one-third of the Indians.  Those who left the field in search of food journeyed a good distance from the battlefield, with many not returning.  The hardcore among them remained in place and awaited the arrival of the hated Kentucky “long knives.”

Price’s men halted about one half-mile from the Indian position and prepared his men for battle.  They took drinks of water, tightened their saddle cinches and stripped off excess clothing before resuming the advance.  Two vedettes  preceded the main body of scouts, Thomas Moore and William Steele, volunteered for this duty.  They moved forward warily watching every bush and tree for sign of Indians, and soon found them.

The Indians opened fire from ambush felling both men from their horses, mortally wounded.  Their comrades charged forward and engaged the Indians, finding Steele dead and rescued Moore.  Under heavy fire Price ordered a withdrawal as the superior number of Indians attacked them.

Unfortunately they ran afoul of Cooke’s advance guard marching about four hundred yards behind the mounted scouts.  Under orders from Wayne for firing on retreating militiamen, Cooke’s men mistakenly fired on the Kentuckians.  This stopped the retreating Kentuckians, who now moved toward the river and reportedly left the field.

The Indians now engaged the small number of Cooke’s men, who valiantly stood their ground against the heavy odds.  After firing three “good volleys” Cooke saw his situation and ordered a fighting withdrawal toward the main body.  As Cooke’s men withdrew, Wayne deployed several companies of light infantry for screening the deployment of his battle line.

Wilkinson proceeded in making adjustments in his battle line when they intermingled with Hamtramck’s men.  He encountered a company of dragoons under the command of the senior dragoon officer, Captain Robert MisCampbell.  MisCampbell then reported that “Everything is confusion,” and asked Wilkinson for orders.  Characteristic of Wilkinson, he declined, stating that his command did not include the dragoons and recommended that MisCampbell fall back.  When one of Wilkinson’s subordinates requested that Wilkinson attack, he declined, citing an absence of orders from Wayne.

Wayne did issue orders that day, sending his staff in every direction for relaying even the most minute orders.  The previous day’s rain and current humidity rendered the use of drums for signaling ineffective.  He told his aide, Lieutenant William Henry Harrison, his standing order, “Charge the damned rascals with the bayonet.”

Believing the terrain near the river suited for mounted troops, Wayne ordered his dragoons into a flanking attack there.  Unfortunately the bluffs along the river hindered a rapid advance by these troops and MisCampbell misunderstood the order.  Instead of attacking with the full dragoon battalion, he used only his assigned company.  When they struck the Indians, MisCampbell fell dead and the attack fell into confusion.  Finally other dragoons appeared, as well as some Kentucky scouts, and eventually turned the Indian flank.

Wayne then ordered the unlimbering of his artillery, sixteen pieces, and opened fire on the Indians.  Although the wooded terrain proved unsuitable for artillery, the psychological effect on the warriors justified their use.

The terrain in front of Wilkinson’s wing appeared more open, providing a better view of the enemy.  While in front of Hamtramck’s wing the terrain appeared more wooded, making his assessment of the enemy more difficult.  Subsequently, Wilkinson deployed his troops into a single battle line, possibly because of his better view.  However, Hamtramck deployed his in the standard double battle line of the day, and in accordance with Wayne’s orders.  This caused some confusion at the point where the two wings linked up, however it did not create insurmountable problems.  Given the reduced numerical strength of the Legion’s companies, most estimates state that the deployment into line took about five minutes.

As the fire from the Indians increased, Wayne maneuvered troops for meeting each contingency.  He ordered Scott’s Kentuckians on his left flank into the attack for turning the Indians’ right flank.  The terrain proved too wooded and swampy for a mounted attack, so Scott dismounted them, using them as infantry.  Here the Kentuckians engaged the Wyandots, who fought the Kentuckians almost fanatically.

Wayne adjusted his force by extending the left flank of the 2nd Sub-Legion until the American line stretched almost two and one-half miles.  Satisfied, he ordered the advance with his men at “trail arms” for preventing their entanglement in the vegetation.  Simply, the men advanced until within musket range, about fifty yards, from the Indians, fired a volley and charged with the bayonet.

Staff officers, seeing Wayne’s dash forward toward the battle, seized his horse’s reins, fearing for his safety.  Despite the constant messages delivered by the staff, several officers did not receive the attack order.  This often occurs during battle, the so-called “fog of war,” as the noise and adrenalin affect one’s abilities.  However, here Wayne’s discipline and training standards proved their worth, as the officers advanced on their own initiative.  Several officers quoted in Gaff’s book state that miraculously the entire line charged almost at once.

Now the Indians began a fighting withdrawal as the numbers of the Legion forced them from their cover.  Groups of Indians stood their ground, many dying in place instead of retreating when overwhelmed.  Others, seeing the superiority of the forces against them, fired once and then ran away and hid.  By most accounts the stiffest resistance came from the Detroit militia, under the command of the American renegade Lieutenant Colonel William Caldwell.  Most of the Indian resistance crumbled after about fifteen minutes and they ran toward Fort Miamis.

These Indians ran toward the shelter of the British fort with the soldiers of the Legion in hot pursuit.  The fort’s commander, Major William Campbell of the 24th Regiment of Foot, lacking any specific orders, literally closed the gates.  Heaping insult upon the defeat they just suffered, the demoralized Indians now realized the steadfastness of British support.  Their British allies closed the gates and left them alone for facing the wrath of the victorious Americans.

With the Indians in full retreat and his men exhausted from the roughly about one hour battle, Wayne called a halt.  The Legion remained on the newly won field for about two hours, resting and refitting.  Details made a quick search for casualties and surgeons began the grisly process of attending the wounded.  The Legion lost 26 killed and 87 wounded with none lost as prisoners of war.  In celebration of the victory the soldiers received an extra ration of whisky and then prepared for further action.

Despite the defeat the Indians still possessed a viable force capable of a counterattack, although they lacked the spirit for it.  However, Wayne and his men did not know this and took all the necessary precautions.  He dispatched his scouts forward for gathering intelligence, not only of the Indians but Fort Miamis as well.  Unfortunately, in his preparation for continuing his attack, Wayne neglected a thorough search for casualties.  Later searches found that some of the wounded lay dying on the field, with one dying soon after his discovery on August 21st.

While this neglect may seem harsh, Wayne must consider the health and safety of the majority of his soldiers.  He must focus on meeting the enemy, before they adequately reorganize, and hopefully limiting the number of future casualties.  Searching for casualties today remains a responsibility of squad and platoon level leaders, and part of unit standard operating procedures (SOP).  Higher headquarters does not specifically order it and depends on the initiative of subordinate leaders.  While Wilkinson and other officers criticized Wayne for “ignoring his wounded,” why did they not remind him?

Regarding his concern for his sick and wounded soldiers, Wayne took great care of them throughout his tenure as commander.  James Ripley Jacobs in his book, The Beginnings of the U.S. Army:  1783-1812, describes Wayne’s policies succinctly.  He gave his surgeon general great latitude in ordering medical supplies and inoculating his soldiers for smallpox.  Each company must provide one soldier as a “hospital steward,” the equivalent of today’s medic, for assisting the surgeons.  He further ordered the hiring of “industrious humane and honest matrons” for serving as nurses.

After the battle Wayne correctly focused on engaging his enemies, and gathering intelligence on their capabilities.  After his scouts returned Wayne left his wounded and surgeons with a guard force and advanced toward the British fort.  He halted his force within one mile of the fort and in full view of the British garrison.  The Legion constructed its fortified camp and settled in for the night, leaving a confrontation with the British for the next day.

During the night an American soldier, John Johnson, deserted and joined the British inside Fort Miamis.  Johnson served with the Loyalist Queen’s Rangers during the Revolution and provided Campbell an accurate account of Wayne’s force and his intentions.  He further revealed that half of Wayne’s force consisted of militia, due for discharge on October 10th.

Ironically a British drummer, John Bevan of the 24th Regiment, deserted the British and slipped into the American camp.  He likewise gave Wayne an accurate report of the British forces inside the fort, and the treachery of the previously mentioned Newman.  Bevan further confirmed that a company of British-armed Canadians fought alongside the Indians, an act of war.  He told Wayne that the Indian army opposing him numbered “about two thousand men,” including the Canadians.

All day on August 21st the Legion rested and prepared for battle, with the men anxiously anticipating storming the fort.  Wayne sent out Price’s battalion for scouting beyond Fort Miamis and searching for sign of the Indians.  With the Indians gone Wayne took a small mounted party forward, including his aide, Harrison, and boldly rode toward the fort.  Harrison stated that they rode within “pistol shot,” meaning a short distance, of the fort and studied the fort for thirty minutes.

An unnamed British officer stated that an impetuous young officer almost fired a loaded cannon on the Americans.  His comrades stopped him and prevented this action, possibly saving Wayne’s life and definitely preventing war between the US and England.

The gates of Fort Miamis opened and a British officer appeared with a small detachment bearing a white flag of truce.  He presented Wayne with a letter from Campbell inquiring of Wayne’s intentions regarding “His Majesty’s” fort.  Wayne sent a rebuttal stating the Campbell illegally occupied the fort and demanded his withdrawal.

Wayne immediately sent for two days rations from Fort Deposit and developed his plans.  He regarded Fort Miamis too strong for attack, particularly since he lacked heavy artillery for battering the walls.  Furthermore, his army lacked the provisions necessary for a prolonged siege and the Indian army still remained at large.  Wayne made several attempts at provoking a British attack, even riding within range himself again, but with no attack.

Meanwhile Wayne further demonstrated the impotence of the British at protecting the Indians by destroying their camp.  With his troops running low on rations they confiscated all the food stored in the camp.  They further destroyed those crops growing in the fields as well as all the buildings.  This ensured a hard winter for the Indians remaining hostile, and a drain on British sources of supplies.  They continued this destruction for the next two days without any interference from either the British or the demoralized Indians.

On August 23rd Wayne formally congratulated his Legion for “brilliant success in the Action of the 20th Instant.”  Incapable of taking the British fort, Wayne and his Legion headed back for Fort Deposit and their provisions and baggage.  On the return Wayne deployed his army in line for sweeping the previous battlefield, searching for any lost or abandoned equipment.  No mention of searching for the missing wounded, but such a sweep surely found them.

As his army moved toward Fort Deposit Wayne and his men remained concerned about the still-absent Indian army.  While the Battle of Fallen Timbers proved a milestone in American history, at the time most believed it merely a skirmish.  The entire battle lasted less than two hours by most historical estimates with only about half of the Legion participating.  The soldiers only found between thirty and forty dead enemies on the battlefield, hardly significant given the overall number of warriors.  However, no records exist regarding those wounded evacuated by the Indians who later died from those wounds.

To be continued





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